Labor & Economic Justice

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that the Industrial Commission (an agency of the state of North Carolina that administers among other things, the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act) did not err in awarding injured plaintiff continued medical treatment and disability payments. Plaintiff became injured while working for his employer, the University of North Carolina (UNC). UNC tried to suspend disability payments, alleging the plaintiff was not complying with rehabilitation efforts. The Industrial Commission ordered UNC to reinstate disability payments. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling in support of the Industrial Commission’s decision because the plaintiff’s claim was only suspended, not terminated as in other cases, and could therefore be reinstated at any time and because the plaintiff’s doctor was an authorized treating physician as UNC had previously accepted the plaintiff’s claims for treatment through that doctor.

Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury and was initially awarded total disability compensation by the Industrial Commission (an agency of the state of North Carolina that administers among other things the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act) until he returned to work, which Plaintiff never did. Later, the Industrial Commission denied the Plaintiff’s request for indemnity compensation based on the lack of evidence that Plaintiff was medically incapable of working or had tried to find employment in the several years following the injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision, finding the Plaintiff was no longer entitled to a presumption of continuing disability, had failed to present additional evidence of a disability, or prove it was futile for him to seek other employment. The Supreme Court affirmed on the same basis.

The North Carolina Association of Educators, 5 tenured public school teachers, and 1 probationary public school teacher brought suit against the State claiming the Career Status Law (a law that entitles a teacher to a basic set of due process protections to ensure that they are treated fairly before being dismissed) was unconstitutional by constituting a taking of property without just compensation under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and as an impairment of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution. Historically, teachers could earn career status by completing a probationary period and receiving a favorable vote from the school board. The Career Status Law retroactively revoked the career status of teachers who had earned status through that process. The Supreme Court held that sections 9.6 and 9.7 of the Career Status Law were unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause to the extent they retroactively applied to teachers who had already attained career status as the law impaired the contractual rights of those teachers without adequate justification.

Plaintiffs were a deputy sheriff and a detention counselor at the county jail who brought suit against the Sheriff for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, alleging they were fired for failing to support the Sheriff’s reelection campaign and for their political beliefs. The Supreme Court held the plaintiffs’ suit failed for the same reasons as in Young v. Bailey, 368 N.C. 665(2016) (holding that a deputy sheriff is not a county employee as such term is defined in NGS section 153A-99 and therefore is not entitled to the statute’s protections). Additionally, for the detention counselor, who was a non-deputy employee of the Sheriff, the court held the defendant had sufficient job-related reasons for the counselor’s termination.

The North Carolina Association of Educators, 5 tenured public school teachers, and 1 probationary public school teacher brought suit against the State claiming the Career Status Law (a law that entitles a teacher to a basic set of due process protections to ensure that they are treated fairly before being dismissed) was unconstitutional by constituting a taking of property without just compensation under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and as an impairment of contracts in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution. Historically, teachers could earn career status by completing a probationary period and receiving a favorable vote from the school board. The Career Status Law retroactively revoked the career status of teachers who had earned status through that process. The Supreme Court held that sections 9.6 and 9.7 of the Career Status Law were unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause to the extent they retroactively applied to teachers who had already attained career status as the law impaired the contractual rights of those teachers without adequate justification.

The Supreme Court found that where plaintiff-employee sustained significant physical injuries as a result of an automobile accident that occurred during the course and scope of his employment, and defendant-employer filed a Form 60 (Employer’s Admission of Employee’s Right to Compensation) accepting that plaintiff had suffered compensable injuries by accident and began paying temporary total compensation and medical compensation for his injuries, the Industrial Commission (an agency of the state of North Carolina that administers among other things the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act) erred by failing to give plaintiff the benefit of a presumption that the additional medical treatment he sought was for conditions related to his compensable injuries. Plaintiff was entitled to a presumption that additional medical treatment for tinnitus (a ringing or buzzing noise in one or both ears that may be constant or come and go, often associated with hearing loss), anxiety, and depression were related to his compensable conditions. Additionally, the Supreme Court found the Industrial Commission erred by failing to address the effects of plaintiff-employee’s tinnitus in determining whether he lost wage-earning capacity. The case was remanded to the Industrial Commission for findings addressing plaintiff’s wage-earning capacity, considering plaintiff’s compensable tinnitus in the context of all the preexisting and coexisting conditions bearing upon his wage-earning capacity.

Developers purchased land from the operator of a neighboring golf course for development as a residential community and hired a contractor to construct erosion control structures and devices. A dam that the contractors built ruptured, causing mud, water and other debris to repeatedly flood the neighboring golf course. The local county natural resources department issued several notices of non-compliance to the developers for having taken insufficient measures to control erosion and sedimentation in violation of North Carolina law. The golf course operator subsequently brought suit against the developers and contractors, alleging, among other claims, violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973 (“SPCA”). The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the SPCA claim because the defendants had only received notices of non-compliance but had not been cited for violation of a relevant law, rule, order or erosion and sedimentation control plan. The Supreme Court held that a violation of, rather than mere noncompliance with, an erosion and sedimentation control plan must have occurred to give rise to a private cause of action under the statute.

Plaintiff suffered work-related injuries after falling over a ladder at work. Defendant employer then filed Forms 60 (Employer’s Admission of Employee’s Right to Compensation) and 61 (the official form used by insurance companies to deny workers’ compensation claims) with the Industrial Commission (an agency of the state of North Carolina that administers among other things the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act), describing some of the Plaintiff’s injuries as compensable and denying the compensability of others, arguing the Plaintiff’s current disability was unrelated to the original injury at work. The Commission found that because the employer had admitted compensability for some injuries, it created a rebuttable presumption that plaintiff’s other injuries were causally related to the original accident and injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision and award of ongoing disability benefits. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings before the Industrial Commission, finding the presumption may not apply to Plaintiff’s claim and it was unclear if the Industrial Commission found plaintiff’s further injuries causally related to the original accident independent of the application of the presumption.